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Abstract
An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) network has emerged as a promising technique to rapidly
provide mobile services to a geographical area, where a flying UAV can be deployed close to mobile
users to serve as a cell site. However, deployment of UAV-aided mobile services (UMS) faces challenges
due to the UAV limitation in wireless coverage and energy storage, which requires both technological
and economic schemes in the system level. There are important economic issues regarding the UAV-user
interaction for service provision, deployment cost and sustainable deployment of the UAV network. These
economic issues are largely overlooked in the literature and this article presents economic solutions for
the UMS deployment and operation for providing UMS. As users’ locations are their private information
and are changing over time, how to ensure users’ truthful location reporting is important for determining
optimal UAV deployment in serving all the users fairly. However, this is challenging given users’
selfishness and a strategic user may misreport his location such that the final UAV placement is closer
to himself but further to the other users. We comprehensively present two UAV placement games for
best serving all the users while ensuring their truthful location reporting. In addition to addressing the
UAV-user interactions via algorithmic game theory, we further study the UAV network sustainability
for UMS service provision by minimizing the energy consumption cost during deployment and seeking
UAV-UAV cooperation. Though the problems are difficult and shown to be NP-complete, we present
tractable deployment solutions for optimizing the bottleneck UAV lifetime and the overall UAV network
performance, respectively. Finally, we study the long-term UAV-UAV cooperation in developing various
cost-aware patrolling schemes and providing users with dynamic UMS services.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed increasingly more exercises and commercial uses of Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) networks for rapidly providing wireless coverage to ground users [1]. The
static territorial base stations are deployed to meet the average-traffic and their network is lack
of the flexibility and agility to adjust to traffic variation and users’ dynamic needs for mobile
services. The flying cell site technology enabled by UAV rapidly expands the wireless coverage
of the static territorial base stations on the ground, where UAVs serve as flying base stations
to serve a geographical area (e.g., congested cell edge or disaster zone) out of the reach or
capacity of the cellular networks. As an auxiliary to traditional ground networks, the network
can be deployed once when the UAV-aided mobile services (UMS) need arises in places and at
times they are needed. Despite their emerging applications, UMS faces many new challenges.
In particular, the endurance and performance of UAV systems are fundamentally limited by
the on-board energy storage, which is practically finite due to the aircrafts size and weight
constraints. Moreover, the coverage radius of UAV is relatively small compared to the target
area to be covered. Thus, how to design the UAV deployment scheme such that a number of
UAVs cooperatively provide UMS is motivated.
The use of UAVs as flying base stations are attracting growing interests from researchers
and the literature focuses on technological issues for UAV network deployment [1] [2] [3]
[4]. For example in [2], UAV-enabled communication models are developed to characterize the
air-to-ground transmission model and explore the line of sight opportunity for UMS. Based
on such models, [3] studies the deployment and trajectory schemes of UAVs to cope with
power transfer or energy minimization. However, upon UAV deployment, these UAV deployment
schemes need to know target users’ locations beforehand as UAVs can only closely service them
after deployment. In practice, however, it can be difficult to collect users’ real-time location
data, and existing user positioning techniques require multiple base stations’ continuous help or
users’ direct GPS reporting [5]. When there is an urgent need for deployment UAV networks
and UMS, the local ground network infrastructure is often congested and may even fail to work
in events of disasters, which makes it difficult for the UAV network to accurately track users’
real-time locations. It is more desirable for the UAV network to directly ask users to report their
private locations for the UAV placement.
To ensure users’ truthful location reporting is important for optimal UAV deployment in
3serving all the users fairly. However, this is challenging given users’ selfishness and a strategic
user may misreport his location such that the final UAV placement is closer to himself but
further to the other users. We need economic innovation for addressing this UAV-user interaction
issue. In the field of algorithmic game theory, there are some prior studies on the generic
facility location games and strategyproof mechanisms to prevent users from misreporting their
locations. Such mechanisms are just based on users’ location reports and are easy to implement,
without using complicated schemes such as pricing and monetary penalty. For example, [6]
propose to place a facility (UAV in our article scenario) at the median of users’ locations
and proved it strategyproof/truthful on a one-dimension location line, which gives us some
inspiration of developing the UAV placement game for UMS and strategyproof mechanisms
in 3D. In [7], the facility is no longer user-friendly as in [6] and users want the obnoxious
facility to be located far away. This is related to another (opposite) scenario that the UAV to be
deployed may interfere with some incumbent users and these users may misreport their locations
to keep the UAV away. Though these works are related and provide some inspiration for our 3D
UAV placement design under asymmetric information of the UAV-user interaction, they are only
limited to homogeneous users in one-dimension. Further, the UAV placement games should take
into account mobile users’ different UMS sensitivities to quality of service (QoS) and reflect the
air-to-ground communication features.
The development of UMS not only requires technological innovations but also economic
innovations in the system level. The truthful location reporting in the UAV-user interaction is
just one aspect for economic innovation, and there are other important economic issues regarding
deployment cost and sustainable operation of the UAV network as well as UAV-UAV cooperation.
These economic issues are largely overlooked in the literature. It should be noted that in the
literature of sensor coverage problems, there are some related work studying the sustainable
sensor network deployment to fully cover a line interval. For example, Zhang et al. in [8]
investigate the problem of minimizing the total cost of sensors on a line interval for reaching
the full coverage. In [9], Lee et al. further study the mobile sensor barrier coverage problem,
in which they propose a fast algorithm to minimize sensors’ maximum moving cost on a line
interval. Such results cannot apply to our UAV deployment problem, as UAVs should be deployed
to the air (beyond one-dimension ground) and UAVs are no longer homogeneous as sensors due
to their diverse flying speeds, hovering altitudes and wireless coverage.
To address the economic issues for UMS, we propose three novel approaches as follows.
4• Approach I: Strategic UAV-user interaction game for UAV placement game. We propose
novel UAV-user interaction games for the UAV under incomplete information to track and
learn users’ locations for its optimal placement in serving all the users. By taking into users’
selfishness and strategic behavior, we design strategyproof mechanisms for ensuring their
truthful location reporting and approaching social optimum under complete information.
(see Section II).
• Approach II: Sustainable UAV network deployment via UAV-UAV cooperation. We further
study the UAV network sustainability by prolonging the UMS service provision period
despite UAVs’ limited energy storage. The UAVs consume major energy in the deploy-
ment phase to their destinations, leaving minor energy for UMS. By seeking UAV-UAV
cooperation, we aim to minimize the energy consumption cost when deploying the whole
UAV network. Though the problems are shown to be NP-complete, we present tractable
deployment solutions for optimizing the bottleneck UAV lifetime and the overall UAV
network performance, respectively. (see Section III).
• Approach III: Cost-aware service provision via cooperative UAV patrolling. Finally, we
study the long-term UAV-UAV cooperation in developing various patrolling schemes and
providing users with dynamic UMS services.(see Section IV)
II. STRATEGIC UAV-USER INTERACTION GAMES FOR UAV PLACEMENT
It is desirable for the UAV network to directly ask users in need to report their own locations
upon UAV deployment, and then the UAV can be optimally deployed for best serving all users.
In this case, however, the key challenge for the optimal UAV placement is that, users are selfish
and may not report their true locations to help the optimal UAV placement for best serving all
users.
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of users of different applications that are located in the 3D
cuboid space I3 in Figure 1. The real location of user i ∈ N is (xi, yi, zi) ∈ I3. We denote x =
(x1, x2, · · · , xn), y = (y1, y2, · · · , yn) and z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn) as users’ location profiles in the
3D space. Depending on the users’ locations, the final UAV’s location is denoted as point (x, y, z).
The distance between user i and the UAV after deployment is thus d((xi, yi, zi), (x, y, z)) =√
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + (zi − z)2. In [10], two UAV placement games are presented where
users may misreport their locations to mislead the UAV placement:
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Fig. 1: System model about the UAV placement in the 3D space. There are generally two types
of users: type 1 (facility) users and type 2 (adverse under the UAV’s interference) users. In the
UAV placement game, all users are of type 1; in the obnoxious UAV placement game, all users
are of type 2; and in the dual-preference UAV placement game, both types of users coexist.
• In the UAV placement game, all users are of type 1 and want the UAV location (x,y,z) to
be close to his own location to enjoy good service or save his service cost.
• In the obnoxious UAV placement game, all users are of type 2 and want to be far from the
UAV location (x,y,z) as far as possible.
A. UAV Deployment Game for Type-1 Users
To formulate the interaction game, we first model users’ objectives as service costs in UMS to
affect their reporting decisions. The service cost of a particular user i to associate with the UAV’s
provided service is modelled as the weighted square distance to the UAV location (x, y, z). This
is motivated by a typical uplink UAV-enabled communication scenario, where a user i consumes
power ci as his service cost to transmit signal to the UAV access point. Following the widely used
light of sight link model for UAV-user communications [11], his signal attenuates over distance
according to path loss exponent 2 in free space. To let the received signal strength at the UAV
exceed an application-dependent decodable requirement wi, i.e., cid((xi, yi, zi), (x, y, z))−2 ≥ wi,
user i bears the minimum service cost ci = wid((xi, yi, zi), (x, y, z))2 as in [12]. Given limited
6energy storage in his mobile terminal, weight wi > 0 models user i’s sensitivity in his specific
traffic application (e.g., voice or video), and he prefers the UAV to be closely located for his
cost saving. If a user has a larger weight, the UAV should be located closer to him.
We denote wi as user i’s weight and w = (w1, w2, · · · , wn) as weight profile. Each user
i’s weight wi can be estimated and verified by the UAV during service period and is public
information. Yet the UAV does not know the users’ location profiles x, y and z. In the UAV
placement game, a mechanism outputs a UAV location (x, y, z) based on a given w, x, y and z
and thus is a function f : I3n → I3, i.e., (x, y, z) = f(x, y, z). The cost of user i is given by
ci(f(x, y, z), (xi, yi, zi)) = wi((xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + (zi − z)2).
The social cost of a mechanism f is defined as the sum of all users’ costs, i.e., SC(f, (x, y, z)) =∑n
i=1 ci(f(x, y, z), (xi, yi, zi)), which implies that weighted mean (x, y, z) = (x¯, y¯, z¯) is the opti-
mal location by balancing all users’ locations, where x¯ =
∑n
i=1 wixi∑n
i=1 wi
, y¯ =
∑n
i=1 wiyi∑n
i=1 wi
, z¯ =
∑n
i=1 wizi∑n
i=1 wi
.
In this game, our target is to design strategyproof mechanisms that perform well with respect
to minimizing the social cost.
It should be noted that the optimal weighted mean mechanism is not strategyproof and no
strategyproof mechanism can achieve optimum. Consider an illustrative 1D example in Figure
2(a) that we want to place a UAV facility to a point in a line interval to serve both user 1 at
1D location x1 = 0 and user 2 at x2 = 2 at the same time. To improve the signal reception
at the UAV side or save his transmit power, each user wants the UAV to be placed closest to
his own location. If both users report their locations truthfully, it is optimal to locate the UAV
at the mean of the two users locations (i.e., x = 1). However, user 2 will change his location
report from x2 = 2 to x
′
2 = 4 such that the mean UAV location changes to x = 2 and is the
closest to user 2. In this section, we aim to study the strategyproof/truthful mechanism design,
where users should be incentivized to report their locations truthfully. Thus, we can see that the
mechanism of deploying the UAV at the mean of the users’ location is not strategyproof.
In [10], we present a strategyproof mechanism by taking into account users’ locations and
their weights.
Mechanism 1. Given users’ location profile (x, y, z), return weighted median location (x, y, z) =
(xwmed, ywmed, zwmed) as the UAV final location, where xwmed, ywmed and zwmed are the weighted
median of x, y, and z domains in the 3D space.
We give an illustrative 1D example to show that the strategyproofness of mechanism 1 by
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(a) Under the optimal weighted mean mechanism (not strategyproof), user 2 will misreport his location from x2 = 2 to
x
′
2 = 4, UAV changes from the mean location x = 1 to location 2 such that it is closest to user 2.
X-domainx1
misreport x2' smaller than x3, no 
change of UAV location
x2 x3 x5x4
Misreport x2'  greater than x3,
UAV moves right 
(b) Strategyproofness of mechanism 1 by considering user 2’s all possible misreports
Fig. 2: Illustrative examples to show that the optimal weighted mean mechanism is not truthful
while the weighted median mechanism is truthful for the UAV placement game.
assuming all users’ weights are the same. As shown in Figure 2(b), assume there are five users
with x1 ≤ x2, . . . ,≤ x5 in the x-domain, and the location of UAV under Mechanism 1 is
xmed = x3. Let us consider user 2 first. If user 2 chooses to misreport his location, we have
only two cases: (i) The misreported x2-value (denoted by x
′
2) is still smaller than x3, which
does not change the UAV location from x3 as user 3 is still in the middle of the five users; (ii)
The misreported x′2 is greater than x3 and the new UAV location x will be not smaller than
x3. However, (x2 − x)2 or user 2’s service cost w2((x2 − x)2 + (y2 − y)2 + (z2 − z)2) will
not decrease. Therefore, user 2 cannot decrease his cost by misreporting his x2 and similarly he
cannot decrease his cost by misreporting his y2 and z2 in the other independent location domains.
Similar arguments hold for other users. While ensuring users’ truthfulness in their location
reporting, this weighted median mechanism can be further proved to be the best mechanism for
minimizing the social cost. Note that if one applies traditional median mechanism in [6] without
8considering the weights, the performance can be arbitrarily poor.
B. Obnoxious UAV Placement Game for Type-2 Users
Then, we consider the opposite problem of locating an obnoxious UAV facility in the 3D space.
Each of n users of type 2 in Figure 1 attempts to stay far away from the UAV to reduce its received
interference, by misreporting his location. Our target is to design strategyproof mechanisms of
UAV placement to maximally keep the social utility of type-2 users. Their (positive) weights wi’s
here tell their different interference sensitivities in their traffic applications. We define adverse
user i’s utility ui as wid((xi, yi, zi), (x, y, z))2 under interference. ui nonlinearly increases with
the distance from the UAV. Opposite to the UAV placement game, the objective in this game is
to maximize the sum of weighted utility, by designing strategyproof mechanisms f(x, y, z) for
the UAV placement. The social utility of a mechanism f is defined as SU(f(x, y, z), (x, y, z)) =∑n
i=1 ui(f(x, y, z), (xi, yi, zi)).
We first obtain the optimal UAV location under full information as benchmark. We can see
that SU(f, (x, y, z)) is convex in (x, y, z) ∈ [0, 2A]× [0, 2B]× [0, 2C], the optimal UAV location
for maximizing the social utility is one of eight vertices in cuboid I3 which is furthest from
point weighted mean (x¯, y¯, z¯).
However, this optimal solution is not strategyproof by considering the illustrative 1D example
in Figure 3(a): there are user 1 at x1 = 0.4A and user 2 at x2 = 1.2A in domain I = [0, 2A]. To
decrease the interference from the UAV, each user wants the UAV to be placed furthest to his
own location. If both users report their locations truthfully, it is optimal to locate the UAV at
the location x = 2A ). However, user 2 will misreport his location from x2 = 1.2A to x
′
2 = 2A
such that the UAV location changes to x = 0 and is the furthest to user 2. Thus, we can see
that the mechanism of deploying the UAV at the optimal location is not strategyproof.
Next we design a strategyproof mechanism.
Mechanism 2. Set UAV location f = (x, y, z), where x = 0 if the sum weight by counting
users in [0, A] is less than that in [A, 2A], i.e.,
∑
xi∈[0,A) wi ≤
∑
xi∈[A,2A] wi, otherwise, x = 2A.
Similarly, we place the UAV in y-domain and z-domain for the weighted majority’s benefit.
In Mechanism 2 [10], we divide the interval equally in every domain into two half-intervals.
In this mechanism 2, as Figure 3(b) shown, in x domain, we compare the total number of users
9X-domain
0
misreport
x2=1.2Ax1=0.4A x'2=2A
(a) Under the optimal location of UAV, user 2 will misreport his location from x2 = 1.2A to x
′
2 = 2A such that the
UAV location changes to x = 0 and is the furthest to user 2.
X-domain
0
misreport
A 2Ax1 x'5x2 x3 x4 x5
(b) Strategyproofness of mechanism 2 by considering the total user weights.
Fig. 3: Illustrative examples to show that the optimal UAV location is not truthful while the
mechanism 2 by considering the total user weights is truthful for the UAV placement game.
in the first half-interval [0, A] and that in the second half-interval (A,2A] in x−domain, and
place the obnoxious UAV to the corner with the smaller total number.
We show an example by only considering x−domain location first to prove strategyproofness,
as y-domain and z-domain can be analyzed similarly. In Figure 3(b), the UAV is placed at
x = 2A. For any user in [0, A], he does not want to misreport his location since he has obtained
the largest utility. For any user in (A, 2A], misreporting his location only increases the number
of users in [0, A], and thus the UAV’s location does not change. Similarly, we place the UAV in
y-domain and z-domain for the majority’s benefit.
C. Discussion and future direction
Our approach enables UAVs to interact with their target users or environment in an intelligent
way. Some possible future research directions are as follows:
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• Dual-preference UAV placement game: In practice, some users (facility user) may want
to get close to UAV, while the others (adverse user) may want to get away from UAV.
We can consider those users co-exist. Besides misreporting true locations, we can further
allow users to misreport their preference types (facility or adverse user) and weights. [10]
presented some preliminary strategyproof mechanism. However, the performance gap with
optimum is large. One possible direction is to design strategyproof mechanism with better
performance.
• Strategic UAV-user game involving placement of multiple UAVs. Take the 3-UAV placement
game in a line interval as an example, we can extend our weighted median mechanism to
respectively locate the three UAVs of the same interest at the first quartile, the second
and third quartiles of users’ weighted location profile. However, it is challenging to obtain
satisfactory performance in this design way. Further, if these UAVs have conflicting interests
in serving their own groups of users and will introduce interference mutually, we need to
design a competition game among them as in [13].
III. SUSTAINABLE DEPLOYMENT VIA UAV-UAV COOPERATION
In last section, we decide an individual UAV’s placement for best servicing users, by learning
their truthful locations beforehand. There is no concern on UAV energy consumption or UAV-
UAV cooperation, while in this section we study the sustainability of a UAV network deployment
for achieving maximum lifetime for cooperatively providing users with UMS. A UAV’s left-
over energy after its deployment to the destination is used for UMS provision and minimizing
its deployment energy is equivalent to maximizing its hovering duration of UMS provision
after deployment. We introduce two ways for characterizing the whole UAV network’s lifetime
for sustainability purpose, depending on whether an energy-drained UAV’s user traffic can be
offloaded to the other cooperative UAVs with extra energy after deployment. Then we have
two deployment problems under partial and full cooperation: one is to minimize the maximum
deployment energy consumption among all UAVs (i.e., min-max optimization problem), and
the other is to minimize the total deployment energy consumption (i.e., min-sum optimization
problem) by cooperatively ”pooling” all UAVs’ traffic after deployment. The former problem
only involves UAV-UAV cooperation in the deployment phase (e.g., which UAV to cover which
part of the service area till full coverage by the whole UAV network), while the latter further
requires cooperation after deployment via UMS traffic offloading from those UAVs out of energy.
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Our sustainable UAV deployment problems take the UAVs’ four-dimensional heterogeneity
in initial locations, hovering altitudes, deployment speeds and wireless coverage into account.
For ease of reading, we center all users on a linear line interval [0, β] on the ground (e.g., a
popular avenue). The UAVs in a set U = {µ1, · · · , µn} are initially rested in different locations
{x1, · · · , xn} along x-axis on the 1D ground before the deployment. Without loss of generality,
we assume x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xn. We denote a UAV µi’s final position after deployment as (x′i, hi)
at hovering altitude hi. After deployment, each UAV µi can only serve nearby users within
a coverage radius ri. That is, UAV µi flies from its initial location (xi, 0) on the ground to
its final destination (x′i, hi) during deployment and then keeps hovering at altitude hi to serve
the associated ground users in [x′i − ri, x′i + ri] of the target user interval. We require a full
coverage over the target interval by deploying n diverse UAVs, i.e., [0, β] ⊆ ⋃n1 [x′i− ri, x′i + ri].
During the deployment, UAV µi travels an Euclidean distance
√
(x
′
i − xi)2 + h2i at constant
flying speed vi. As, consumed energy of UAV µi is proportional to the deployment time, itis
given by Ei(x
′
i) = g(vi) ·
√
(x
′
i−xi)2+h2i
vi
, where g(vi) as a function of velocity vi is the consumed
power per time as in [14].
Given the UAV heterogeneity, our two sustainable UAV deployment problems belong to the
domain of combinatorial optimization and the interval UAV deployment solution is a specific
combination of ordered UAVs, which is generally exponential in the number of UAVs. Both
problems are proved to be NP-complete even if the target service area is simplified to [0, β]
in 1D [15]. By capturing different UAVs’ initial locations xi’s, coverage radii ri’s, hovering
altitudes hi’s and flying speeds vi’s, the UAV deployment problems are beyond prior literature’s
deployment methods for homogeneous sensors. The UAVs’ multi-dimensional heterogeneity
results in exponential number of sequences and combinations for UAVs’ deployment algorithm
design.
A. min-max sustainable deployment under partial UAV-UAV cooperation
In this problem, the network lifetime ends once a UAV stops to work due to energy shortage,
and UAVs only cooperate in the deployment phase for saving the bottleneck UAV for providing
UMS. Our optimization problem is thus min{x′1,x′2···x′n} max1≤i≤n
Ei(x
′
i) under the constraint that
[0, β] ⊆ ⋃n1 [x′i − ri, x′i + ri], where we want to balance the deployment energy consumption
among all UAVs and cooperatively optimize the energy bottleneck till reaching the full coverage
of the target area.
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We first present our optimal approach when n UAVs are initially co-located at a common
UAV ground station. (i.e., xi = xj for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n). Without loss of generality, we assume that
xi ≤ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, which is symmetric to the case of xi ≥ β. As shown in [4], the problem is
not difficult by removing this dimension of UAV diversity and can be solved in O(n2).
We note that in our problem, we dispatch all UAVs simultaneously, which is equivalent to
dispatching UAVs one by one to cover the target line interval [0, β]. Now we use Figure 4 to
illustrate our optimal sustainable deployment approach. As shown in Figure 4, initially, we have
n = 3 UAVs (µ1, µ2, µ3) and start to dispatch one of them (i.e., the user with minimum energy
consumption miniEi(x′i = β − ri) = g(vi) ·
√
(x
′
i−xi)2+h2i
vi
among the three UAVs) to just cover
furthest point β. Notice that a UAV µi with a large coverage radius ri or a small hovering height
hi can save its deployment distance and should be chosen first. Suppose µ3 is selected, we
dispatch it to the new position (β− ri, hi). Then the uncovered interval decreases from [0, β] to
[0, β − 2r3]. Then, we continue to dispatch another unassigned UAV (e.g., followed by µ2) with
minimum energy consumption as compared to µ1) to just cover endpoint β− 2r3. The approach
ends until we assign enough UAVs to cover the whole target interval. Finally, we obtain the
network lifetime by observing the residual energy as E0−max{E1, E2, E3} where E0 is UAV’s
initial energy storage.
0
µ1
µ2
E2
E1
E3
µ3
β β -2r3β-2r2-2r3 β - r3
Fig. 4: Illustration of the optimal min-max deployment approach when n = 3 UAVs are initially
co-located at the origin.
For the general case that UAVs have different initial locations upon deployment, we show the
min-max deployment problem for sustainability is NP-complete and difficult to solve [15]. For
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analysis tractability, we propose an approximation that UAVs preserve their initial locations’ order
throughout the deployment, which also helps avoid any possible collision when two UAVs cross
each other to reach their final positions. By applying the fully polynomial time approximation
scheme (FPTAS), we can obtain the solution to efficiently and arbitrarily approach the global
optimum [15].
B. min-sum UAV network deployment under full UAV-UAV cooperation
We further consider the total UAV network’s energy consumption objective as the summation
of energy consumption of all UAVs till reaching the full coverage over the target interval.
This is feasible under full UAV-UAV cooperation in providing UMS services, by offloading
traffic of those out of energy. In this case, even when some UAV stops to work due to energy
shortage, its neighboring peers help offload its traffic and the network lifetime continues. Our
sustainability optimization problem is thus min{x′1,··· ,x′n}
∑
1≤i≤n
Ei(x
′
i) under the full coverage
constraint [0, β] ⊆ ⋃n1 [x′i − ri, x′i + ri]. Different from the prior min-max problem, the min-
sum problem targets at minimizing the sum of all UAVs energy consumption in system level.
Yet, our min-sum problem is more challenging than the min-max problem, since the min-max
problem only focuses on the bottleneck UAV while the min-sum problem needs to coordinately
all UAVs in the configuration to contribute to the sum energy consumption. We first introduce the
feasibility checking procedure to determine whether we can find a deployment scheme within the
network’s given energy consumption budget. Dynamic programming is applied in this procedure
by sequentially dispatching the UAVs one by one according to an order requirement, which starts
with the leftmost point in [0, β].
C. Discussions and future directions
In simulations, we set mean UAV speed as 40 kilometers per hour, mean coverage radius as
2.0 kilometers, mean hovering altitude as 5.0 kilometers. In Figure 5(a), min-max problem is
solved by both min-sum and min-max approach. As the number of UAVs increases, the energy
consumption of both approaches decreases due to the UAV diversity gain, as more UAVs have
larger coverage radius, smaller hovering altitudes and higher flying speeds. Figure 5(a) tells
that minimizing the maximum deployment energy consumption can imply a significant increase
in total deployment energy consumption. Similarly, Figure 5(b) also tells that minimizing the
14
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Fig. 5: Comparison of two sustainable UAV deployment schemes
total deployment energy consumption can imply a significant increase in maximum deployment
energy consumption in the bottleneck UAV.
Some possible future research directions are as follows:
• Extension of the target service area to 2D: Recall that both min-max and min-sum problems
are already NP-complete even if the target is a 1D line interval, thus the general problem
of covering users in a 2D area is also NP-complete. Moreover, to reach a full coverage
in the 2D plane by using UAVs’ disk-shaped coverage circles is also challenging. The full
coverage problem without any interstices is difficult to solve by using heterogeneous UAVs’
diverse coverage circles.
• Dynamic patrolling to save UAV number and energy: So far, we consider each UAV’s static
hovering after deployment to continuously serve a fixed group of users below. If the QoS of
UMS allows some service delay, we can use a smaller number of UAVs to cooperative patrol
in the target area to serve users on demand. Then the problem is how to design cooperative
routing for different UAVs to complement and efficiently cover the whole target area.
IV. COST-AWARE SERVICE PROVISION VIA COOPERATIVE UAV PATROLLING
In last section, we focus on the deployment phase of the UAV network for saving the energy
for forthcoming service provision. In this section, we explicitly study the operation phase for
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sustainable service provision and want to analyze how UAVs (after deployment) cooperate with
each other. Unlike Section III, UAVs are no longer limited to serve their static service regions
([yi − ri, yi + ri] for UAV µi) but can dynamically patrol any region in a cooperative fleet. This
fully exploits the UAVs’ mobility and cooperation in the operation phase ands saves the number
of UAVs needed for UMS. In cellular networks, ground base stations can efficiently serve users
nearby yet have difficulty to cover those at the cell edge. As shown in Fig. 7, we propose a
cooperative UAV patrolling approach for sustainable user coverage at the cell edge. As UAVs
are moving and can only serve users locally, a user inevitably experiences service delay and we
want to design patrolling schemes for minimizing the service delay for any user, requiring the
cooperation among UAVs. This problem is also equivalent to minimizing the UAV fleet’s travel
distance or energy consumption given any service delay constraint.
More specifically, a set of UAVs (µ1, µ2, . . . , µn) with identical speed v fly along hexagon
cell edges, and each total cell edge length is denoted as L. We want to determine the motion
of UAVs so as to minimize the service delay D, i.e., the longest time interval during which any
fixed point of the edges remains unvisited by any UAV for any point on the cell edge. There
are in general two patrolling schemes for the UAV fleet:
• Partition patrolling: UAVs are assigned separate and seamless service regions on the cell
edge, where each UAV patrols its own isolated region without visiting the others’.
• Cyclic patrolling: UAVs form a fleet to follow the same route one by one to visit all points
on the cell edge. There is some distance between UAVs to design to avoid frequent revisiting
of the same user.
Next, we first analyze and compare these two patrolling schemes in a single cell and then extend
to a multi-cell scenario.
A. Cooperative UAV patrolling in a single cell
In the single cell, there is a depopulated zone (e.g., lake or mountain) spanning distance ∆L
and users can only appear on the other (1 − ∆)L edge as shown in Figure 6. The UAVs can
pass the depopulated zone without serving any user.
In the partition patrolling scheme for a single cell, we partition the whole cell edge equally into
n non-overlapping segments and each of the n UAV repeatedly patrols in one dedicated segment
of distance (L−∆L)/n. There are two endpoints of each segment and the assigned UAV just
alternately visits both endpoints. The service delay is computed by counting from the UAV’s
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departure of a point till its return in another direction, and can be as large as Dpartition =
2(L−∆L)
nv
for an endpoint.
In the cyclic patrolling scheme, however, any two neighboring UAVs have distance L/n in
between and they move in the same direction (e.g., clock-wise) along the whole cell edge L.
After a UAV’s departure, each point at the cell edge is revisited after service delay Dcyclic = Lnv .
We denote c as the equipment cost of UAV. The capital expenditure is c · n. The operational
cost for each UAV µi per time is g(vi). Thus, we define the total cost for cooperative UAV
patrolling as E = c · n+∑ni=1 g(vi). In our cooperative UAV patrolling, our target is to design
the patrolling strategy to minimize the total cost such that the service delay is no less than D.
By giving a service delay D, we can obtain the flying speed of UAV vpartition =
2(L−∆L)
nD
in
partition strategy, vcyclic = LnD in cyclic strategy.
Thus, in partition strategy, our total cost is Epartition = cn+
∑n
i=1 g(
2(L−∆L)
nD
), while the total
cost in cyclic strategy is Ecyclic = cn+
∑n
i=1 g(
L
nD
). By comparing Epartition and Ecyclic, we can
conclude that which strategy is better with respect to the total cost.
B. Cooperative UAV patrolling in multi-cell case
Suppose we are given a cellular network with multiple partially overlapped hexagonal cells.
We want to determine the motion of UAVs so as to minimize the total cost. Both strategies may
apply similarly. For cyclic strategy, the main challenge of multi-cell is how to find a shortest
closed path that traverse all edges of the cellular network. Apparently, the degree of the common
vertexes in Figure 6 are odd, so we are not able to find a shortest closed path that traverse all
cells’ edges once exactly (a Euler circuit). Alternatively, we seek for a shortest path that that
traverse all cells’ edges once at least, which is a classical Chinese Postman Problem (CPP) and
can be optimally solved in polynomial time by applying the algorithm of Edmonds and Johnson
[16]. For our multi-cell scenario, for the overlapped edge between two cells, we can simply
create another virtual path of the same length, then can find a closed path going through all
paths (including virtual ones) and once for each path. Thus, we can obtain that the total cost is
cn+
∑n
i=1 g(
7L
2nD
) as in Figure 6.
As for partition strategy, we have several UAVs which cover the service over the cell edges
for a subproblem. From an economical point of view, finding a closed path for all UAVs as
previous cyclic strategy is not sufficient, since the maximum service delay of each sub-path for
each UAV should be minimized. Instead of minimizing the sum of all tour costs, the problem of
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Fig. 6: A shortest closed path starts and ends at A in which UAV traverses all edges of the
cellular network.
Min-Max k-postman problem is to minimize the maximum cost among all paths. However, this
problem is proved to be NP-hard in general graph [17]. The 1-postman path P obtained by the
algorithm of Edmonds and Johnson [16] can be subdivided in the following way: First, k − 1
so called splitting nodes on P are determined in such a way that they mark path segments of P
approximately having the same length. Then k paths are constructed by connecting these path
segments with shortest paths to the UAV original location. In such way, k paths with approximate
lengths can be obtained.
C. Further discussion and new directions
Our approach enables UAVs to dynamically patrol any region in a cooperative fleet. Some
possible future research directions are as follows:
• From sustainable perspective, we can divide the UAVs into groups. Both groups take the
patrolling mission in round robin scenes, where one group can fly back to station for
charging while the other works for the patrolling.
• We can also consider that the UAVs may have different maximum speeds to patrol a target
region such that the service delay is minimized.
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V. CONCLUSION REMARK
There are important economic issues regarding the UAV-user interaction for service provision,
UAV-UAV cooperation, the deployment cost and sustainable operation of the UAV network. In
this article, in order to ensure the users’ truthful location reporting, we present two UAV place-
ment game for best serving them. In addition to addressing the UAV-user interactions via game
theory, we further study the UAV network sustainability by minimizing the energy consumption
cost when deploying the UAV network. We present feasible deployment solutions for optimizing
the bottleneck UAV lifetime and the overall UAV network performance, respectively. Finally,
we study the long-term UAV-UAV cooperation in developing various patrolling schemes and
providing users with low cost UMS services.
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